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Abstract 
This paper examines the first deployment of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs) to Greece’s 
external land border with Turkey on 2 November 2010. It argues that the sending of the RABITs to Greece 
reveals some of the core challenges inherent in Europe’s external border and asylum policies. Most 
importantly, it signals the limits of the principle of solidarity and fair-sharing of responsibility and the failure 
of the EU Dublin System. The paper argues that the sending of RABITs fails to show a long-standing 
(solidarity-based) answer by the EU to the situation of unrest taking place in Greece on two grounds: First, 
the deployment is merely of a emergency, temporary and (in)security (police)-driven nature; and second, the 
strengthening of the common EU external land border between Greece and Turkey may further increase the 
tensions by enlarging the distance between the external border control practices and Europe’s commitment to 
the rights and freedoms of asylum-seekers and refugees. 
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‘Joint Operation RABIT 2010’ – FRONTEX 
Assistance to Greece’s Border with Turkey: 
Revealing the Deficiencies of Europe’s Dublin Asylum System 
Sergio Carrera and Elspeth Guild
* 
CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe, November 2010 
Introduction 
On 24 October 2010, the Greek Government sent an urgent call to Brussels for assistance in the 
control of its external land border with Turkey due to an “exceptional mass inflow of irregular 
immigrants”. The day after the request by Greece, Ilkka Laitinen, Executive Director of Frontex 
(the European Agency for the management of operational cooperation at the EU external 
borders in Warsaw), announced his intention to support to Greece by increasing “the control and 
surveillance levels at Greece’s external border with Turkey” and “strengthening the external EU 
border”.
1 The case has led to the first deployment of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
(RABITs) since their formation in 2007.  
The RABITs consist of a team of specially trained experts (border guards) from EU member 
states who can be deployed under the coordination of Frontex on a temporary basis as a means 
of rapid operational assistance on border control and surveillance. The activation of the RABIT 
mechanism relies on a request by a member state facing a situation of ‘urgent and exceptional 
pressure’ in light of the number of arrivals at points of the external borders of third country 
nationals trying to enter the EU’s territory without proper documentation. The ‘emergency 
situation’ constitutes therefore the connecting factor for their operability. Their primary tasks 
are to strengthen external border security and prevent undocumented immigration. What has 
been already denominated as the ‘Joint Operation RABIT 2010’ has led to the deployment of 
175 border control specialists to the Greek region of Orestiada and neighbouring areas (in total 
12.5 km) on 2 November 2010 for a preliminary period of two months.  
The request from Greece was also followed by a statement by Cecilia Malmström, 
Commissioner in charge of Home Affairs: 
“The situation at the Greek land border with Turkey is increasingly worrying. The 
flows of people crossing the border irregularly have reached alarming proportions and 
Greece is manifestly not able to face this situation alone. I am very concerned about 
the humanitarian situation. I trust that proper assistance will be given to all persons 
crossing the border and that the request for international protection will be considered, 
in full compliance with EU and international standards” (emphasis added).
2  
                                                      
* Sergio Carrera is Head of Section and Research Fellow at CEPS and Visiting Lecturer at the University 
of Kent (Brussels). Elspeth Guild is Jean Monnet Professor of European Migration Law at the Radboud 
University of Nijmegen, partner at the London law firm Kingsley Napley and Senior Research Fellow at 
CEPS. 
1 “Frontex deploys Rapid Border Intervention Teams to Greece”, Frontex News Release, 25 October 2010 
(www.frontex.europa.eu). 
2 Statement by Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner in charge of Home Affairs on the request of 
the Greek government to get assistance via Rapid Border Intervention Teams at the land border between 
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On 5 November 2010, Malmström, together with Laitinen and the French Minister of 
Immigration Éric Besson visited the Greek-Turkish land border to meet the RABITs. The 
Commissioner remarked: “We have shown European solidarity…we’ve been working with 
Greece in recent years and are now also working together to find long-term solutions to enhance 
Greece’s asylum capacity”.
3 The first test of the RABITs needs to be first examined within the 
current Greek national context which has been the subject in recent years of serious concern on 
the part of international and European actors alluding to the failure of its asylum system, which 
remains in a critical relationship with basic EU asylum law standards and fundamental rights as 
envisaged in the 1951 Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. Greece continues to be 
amongst the EU member states with the lowest recognition rate of refugees in the entire EU 
(which is very close to ‘zero’), which is striking in light of the high volume of entries by 
nationals from countries identified as major sources of refugees by the UN Refugee Agency 
(UNHCR), such as Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia and Palestine. The backlog of asylum 
applications in the country only continues to increase as time passes. Evidence has shown the 
lack of adequate reception conditions for asylum seekers and refugees and the conduct of 
‘border control practices’ whose compatibility with the principle of non-refoulement (according 
to which no state can expel a refugee to the frontiers of territories where his/her life or freedom 
would be threatened) remain at stake. While the Greek government has promised to carry out a 
new asylum law reform aiming at correcting these deficiencies,
4 the latter has been subject to 
several delays and the prospects for effective change remain far from imminent.  
Greece’s location positions the country at the gates of the Schengen territory and the common 
EU external territorial border. Geography further increases its degree of ‘responsibility’ in the 
scope of the EU’s asylum policy and the so-called ‘Dublin System’, according to which the first 
state through which an asylum-seeker has first entered the common EU territory is the one 
responsible for examining the refugee’s claim. The absence of a functional asylum procedure 
with sufficient safeguards to ensure the respect of the right to seek asylum (now incorporated 
into the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) has provoked several EU Member States (such as 
for instance Belgium, Sweden, the Netherlands and the UK) to stop ‘sending back’ asylum 
seekers to Greece. The European Commission has also informally opened infringement 
proceedings against the country and there are two preliminary rulings before the Court of 
Justice in Luxembourg concerning Greece’s stance, as well as a pending case before the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. All these factors need to be taken into 
consideration at times of contextualizing the first deployment of the RABITs as they represent 
an important test for the entire EU’s external border and asylum policy.  
This Policy Brief examines the Frontex Operation RABIT 2010. It argues that the sending of the 
RABITs to the Greek-Turkish land border reveals some of the core challenges inherent in the 
intersection of Europe’s external border and asylum policies. It most importantly signals the 
limits of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility in an enlarged EU and the 
failure of the EU Dublin System. It also challenges the assumption that all EU member states 
duly comply with adequate asylum procedures and human rights obligations as enshrined in EU 
and internal instruments, in particular those pertaining to the obligation to ensure access to 
protection and human dignity by asylum-seekers and refugees. After outlining the nature of the 
rapid teams’ mechanism and the scope of their first operation, we examine the situation in 
Greece as regards “the urgent and exceptional pressure of illegal immigrants” which has 
                                                      
3 “Papoutsis, Besson, Malmström and Laitinen visit RABIT operational area”, Frontex News Release, 5 
November 2010 (www.frontex.europa.eu). 
4 Press Release by the Greek Ministry of Citizen Protection, “Greece sends its National Action Plan for 
Migration Management to the European Commission”, Athens, 25 August 2010 
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constituted the activating factor substantiating the first deployment of the RABITs. Section 3 
provides an overview of the failing asylum policy in the country and the difficulties that it poses 
to the foundations and well-functioning of EU external borders and asylum law. Section 4 
concludes by testing the EU’s response in light of the principles of proportionality, effectiveness 
and fundamental rights. We argue that the sending of RABITs fails to show a long-standing 
inability of the EU to mobilise a (solidarity-based) answer by the EU to the situation of unrest 
taking place in Greece on two main grounds: first, the deployment is merely of an emergency, 
temporary and (in)security (police)-driven nature; and second, the strengthening of the common 
EU external land border between Greece and Turkey may further increase the tensions by 
enlarging the distance between the external border control practices and Europe’s commitment 
to the rights and freedoms of asylum-seekers and refugees.  
1.  The Frontex Operation RABIT 2010 
The creation of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams dates back to July 2007 with the adoption 
by Council of Regulation 863/2007, which amended the previous Regulation 2007/2004 
establishing Frontex by outlining the tasks and powers of guest border guards in a requesting 
EU member state.
5 The mechanism aimed at increasing the capacity and coordination-related 
competences of Frontex to provide operational assistance – in particular personnel and technical 
resources – to a member state “facing a situation of urgent and exceptional pressure” as regards 
undocumented immigration.
6 It also intended to contribute in increasing ‘solidarity and mutual 
assistance’ between member states in the management of the common EU external border.
7 
After receiving the request by a Member State, which is required to include a description of the 
situation, the aims and the envisaged needs for the deployment, Regulation 863/2007 leaves the 
final say of the decision for the deployment of the teams to the Frontex Executive Director. The 
latter is required to take a decision no later than five working days after the receipt of the 
request, at which time the teams shall be deployed. In addition to this information provided by 
the country concerned, the positive decision for deployment by Frontex will need to be based on 
the findings of its “risk analyses” of the situation as well as “other relevant data made available 
by the Member State concerned”.
8 During the short time-lapse of five days, Frontex is entitled 
to examine the situation at the external borders of the requesting member state and has the 
possibility of sending experts from the Agency for these same purposes.  
Frontex decides on the profiles and number of border guards that will be made available in a so-
called ‘Rapid Pool’ which is fed by the Member States’ contributions via national expert pools 
with border guards matching the required profiles. Frontex Executive Director and the 
requesting Member State need to agree on an Operational Plan delineating the conditions for the 
deployment of the teams and its final composition. After the mechanism has been activated, 
Member States have the obligation to make border guards available for the deployment “unless 
they are faced with an exceptional situation substantially affecting the discharge of national 
tasks”.
9 The RABITs are not intended to provide long-term assistance, but are of a temporary 
                                                      
5 Regulation No. 863/2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
and amending Council Regulation No. 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and 
powers of guest officers, 11 July 2007, OJ L199/30, 31.7.2007. 
6 Article 1 of the Regulation. 
7 Recital 6 of the Preamble of the Regulation.  
8 Article 8d (Procedure for deciding on the deployment of the teams) of the Regulation EC/2007/2004, 
establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union, 26 October 2004, OJ L 349/1, 25.11.2004. 
9 Ibid., Article 4.3. 4 | CARRERA & GUILD 
 
nature. During the deployment the border authorities coming from other EU Member States are 
under the instructions by the host member state as specified in an operational plan, which 
provides the details of the deployment such as the modus operandi, the objectives of the 
deployment and its duration, the description of the tasks and instructions, and the composition 
of the teams and equipment.
10  
The powers of the RABITs include all tasks for border control and surveillance. As a general 
rule, their activities always need to take place “in the presence of border guards of the host 
Member State”.
11 While wearing their own uniform, they will also need to wear a blue armband 
with the insignia of the EU and the Frontex agency. They are also entitled to carry out “service 
weapons, ammunition and equipment as authorised according to the home Member state’s 
national law”. In the performance of their tasks the teams will be allowed to use force (including 
weapons and ammunition) in the presence of national border guards and national law and to 
consult national and EU databases considered to be necessary for border control and 
surveillance. The members of the teams remain ‘national’ border guards of their home member 
state and remain subject to disciplinary measures there should any problem arise in the 
conduction of their tasks in the host member state. 
Returning to the case study, after receiving the request from the Greek Minister of Citizen 
Protection Christos Papoutsis on the 24th of October, Frontex Executive Director Ilkka Laitinen 
stated:  
The situation in Greece is very serious…I have decided that Frontex will provide 
assistance to the Greek border authorities by deploying adequate number and 
composition of Rapid Border Intervention Teams. Once deployed they will be 
operating under the command and control of the Greek authorities. A team of Frontex 
staff is on its way to the Greek/Turkish land border to assess the situation in view of 
Minister Papoutsis’ request. We will decide how many officers and what kind of 
technical means will be needed to effectively assist the Greek authorities in 
strengthening this external EU border and act swiftly to provide the assistance that this 
Member State has requested.
12 (emphasis added) 
The next day after this declaration, a press release published by Frontex announced that Laitinen 
had already signed the decision to send the RABIT to Greece and declared that “Frontex stands 
ready to assist Greece by activating the RABIT mechanism in this urgent and exceptional 
situation in order to augment Greece’s national efforts to deal with this problem”.
13 The press 
release also indicated that staff from the pilot Frontex Operational Office (FOO) in Piraeus, 
which was inaugurated on 1 October 2010 and constitutes the first regional office of the Agency 
outside its headquarters in Warsaw, had also arrived at the Greek-Turkish border to conduct 
another assessment of the situation.
14 The FOO’s origins date back to an invitation by the 
Council in 2008 to Frontex for improving its coordinative efforts in the management of the 
                                                      
10 Article 8e of Regulation EC/2007/2004, establishing a European Agency for the Management of 
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, 26 
October 2004, OJ L 349/1, 25.11.2004. 
11 Article 6.3.  
12 “Frontex deploys Rapid Border Intervention Teams to Greece”, Frontex News Releases, 25 October 
2010 (www.frontex.europa.eu). 
13 “Frontex executive Director signs decision to deploy RABITs”, Frontex News Releases, 26 October 
2010 (www.frontex.europa.eu). 
14 “Frontex Operational Office opens in Piraeus”, Frontex News Releases, 1 October 2010 
(www.frontex.europa.eu). ‘JOINT OPERATION RABIT 2010’ - FRONTEX ASSISTANCE TO GREECE’S BORDER WITH TURKEY | 5 
 
external borders,
15 in particular “in regions affected by increased migratory pressure”.
16 The 
decision to set up the first specialised branch in the form of a pilot in Piraeus was taken in 
February 2010 and it was finally set up in August 2010 at the HQ of the Hellenic Coast Guard. 
Five days later, the Frontex Operation RABIT 2010 in the Greek-Turkish border was launched. 
The actual deployment of experts and means was planned for 2 November 2010, and the 
operation is expected to run for a period of at least two months. The geographical area that will 
be covered corresponds with the Greek-Turkish land border in the region of Orestiada and 
neighbouring areas. In explaining the visit of Commissioner Malmström to the operational 
region last 5 November, Laitinen remarked: 
The aims of this operation are clearly defined and achievable…Firstly, to bring the 
situation under control – ensuring that all times that irregular migrants are properly 
identified and treated in line with our commitment to fundamental rights and human 
dignity. Secondly, we intend to have an impact on migratory flows in the area, and 
thirdly, to assist the Greek authorities in border management.
17 
The operation consists of 175 ‘border control-experts’ from the 26 member states and 
Schengen-associated countries. They include “experts in false documents, clandestine entry, 
first and second-line border checks and stolen vehicles as well as dog handlers and specialist 
interviewers, debriefers and interpreters”.
18 The assets made available from member states’ 
commitments to Frontex’s Centralised Record of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE),
19 
include:  
-  1 Helicopter (Romania) 
-  1 Bus (Romania)  
-  5 Minibuses (1 Romania, 2 Austria, 1 Bulgaria, 1 Hungary)  
-  19 Patrol cars (4WD) (7 Romania, 3 Austria, 2 Slovakia, 7 Germany) 
-  9 Thermo Vision Vans (2 Austria, 2 Bulgaria, 4 Germany, 1 Hungary) 
-  3 Schengen buses (1 Austria, 2 Hungary)  
-  3 office units from Denmark. 
The Frontex Operation RABIT 2010 has been presented at EU official level as evidence of 
effective ‘European solidarity’. There are several issues, however, which in our view challenge 
the effectiveness of the RABITs in light of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
                                                      
15 Council Conclusions on the Management of the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union of 5 June 2008. See also European Pact on Immigration and Asylum adopted on 15 and 
16 October 2008. 
16 FRONTEX General Report 2009, p. 9. Deloitte (2009), Study on the Feasibility of establishing 
Specialized Branches of FRONTEX, Final Report (www.frontex.europa.eu). 
17 “Papoutsis, Besson, Malmström and Laitinen visit RABIT operational area”, Frontex News Releases, 5 
November 2010 (www.frontex.europa.eu). 
18 “Frontex to deploy 175 specialist border personnel to Greece”, Frontex News Releases, 29.10.2010, 
(www.frontex.europa.eu). 
19 By 1 January 2008, CRATE contained 18 aircraft, 20 helicopters and 91 vessels, and in 2009 the 
number of member states contributed increased from 8 to 13. Commission Impact Assessment 
accompanying the Proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation No 2007/2004 establishing a 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union (FRONTEX), SEC(2010) 149, 24.2.2010, page 12. 6 | CARRERA & GUILD 
 
responsibility as enshrined in Article 80 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union
20 in the domain of external border controls.  
First, the RABITs have been conceived to intervene only in a situation of particular emergency 
in one particular member state. This has meant that since their origins in 2007, the mechanism 
has not been used even once until the current Greek-Turkish land border case. During the last 
three years many observers have alluded to the lack of their real added value.  
Second, the RABIT mechanism can only be deployed on a temporary basis due to its intrinsic 
link with situations of ‘mass inflow’ of undocumented immigrants. They are therefore far from 
providing a long-standing and permanent response by the Union to the responsibilities held by 
those EU member states facing more difficulties in the management of the EU’s external 
borders in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code and EU asylum law. The European 
Commission has tried to address the temporary nature of the rapid teams in its latest proposal 
amending Frontex Regulation COM(2010) 61 of February 2010, which is currently being 
negotiated in the Council.
21 The initiative has put forward the idea of setting up Frontex Joint 
Support Teams (FJST), which would constitute a pool of national border guards on semi-
permanent detachment from EU member states to Frontex headquarters and which would hold 
the status of national experts.
22  
Third, the rapid teams are composed by a widely heterogeneous and dispersed team of 175 
national (border guards) experts from all EU member states and associated (Schengen) 
countries. The Rapid Pool is formed by an enormously diverse set of national authorities in 
charge of border controls in the EU. In a majority of EU member states, the law enforcement 
authorities in charge of border controls and surveillance are actually the police. Some EU 
member states operate a specialised agency (border guard) dealing specifically with border 
controls outside the police corps.
23 The diversified picture of authorities responsible for border-
control activities in the EU which take part in the RABITs is likely to reveal the uncertainties 
and disaggregation surrounding the application of EU external borders law depending on the 
kind of service at stake in each national arena. The main concern is not only that it  is still 
unclear in some member states which authorities are in charge of border controls (in between 
border guards and policemen, or even military in the case of Malta or pseudo-military in the 
case of the Guardia Civil in Spain). It also poses questions at times of ensuring a clear division 
and rationalisation of border guarding tasks (and competences) in compliance with the 
Schengen Borders Code and their accountability in light of the latter.  
Others issues include the difficulties that will be encountered at times of ensuring a common 
working methodology in a multi-curricula and multi-lingual environment in the field. How are 
they going to ensure that the guarantees envisaged by the Schengen Border Code are fully 
                                                      
20 The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the 
principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the 
Member States. Whenever necessary, the Union acts adopted pursuant to this Chapter shall contain 
appropriate measures to give effect to this principle”. 
21 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 
establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders 
of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX), COM(2010) 61 final, Brussels, 24.2.2010. 
22 Refer to Article 3b (Composition and deployment of Frontex Joint Support Teams) and Article 3c 
(Instructions to the Frontex Joint Support Teams).  
23 This is the case for instance in Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland. For 
a full list of national services in charge of external border controls in the scope of the SBC refer to Annex 
1 of S. Carrera (2010), Towards a Common European Border Service?, CEPS Working Document No. 
331, June, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS, Brussels.  ‘JOINT OPERATION RABIT 2010’ - FRONTEX ASSISTANCE TO GREECE’S BORDER WITH TURKEY | 7 
 
complied with in all the activities that will take place in the scope of the Operation? 
Furthermore, as Amnesty International and the European Council of Refugees and Exiles 
(ECRE) have rightly underlined in a Report assessing the above-mentioned Commission’s 
proposal COM(2010) 61,
24 an issue of serious concern is the high degree of ambiguity 
characterising the responsibilities of the guest border guards from other EU member states, 
Frontex personnel and the receiving member state’s authorities and their respective 
responsibility (and potential liability in cases of abuses and/or disproportionate behaviour in 
border control-related activities). The main concern here is that the blurring of tasks and 
responsibilities “potentially permits member states to engage in border management with 
impunity”.
25 
Fourth, the national border guards participating in the Frontex Operation RABIT 2010 are said 
to be mainly experts on ‘border controls’ which combine among others specialists on false 
documents, clandestine entry, first and second-line border checks and stolen vehicles. While it 
is far from clear what precisely an expert on ‘clandestine entry’ might actually mean, it can be 
concluded that the RABITs are mainly composed of national law enforcement authorities 
deemed to be specialists on ‘strengthening border control’ against undocumented immigration. 
It is however noticeable that the above-mentioned press release by Frontex has emphasised that 
“All RABIT officers receive mandatory human rights awareness training as part of their RABIT 
training by Frontex and in addition, special briefings will be held on the spot”. As we will 
develop in Sections 3 and 4 below, it is uncertain the extent to which police (coercive)-oriented 
assistance should have been the one prioritised at EU level to deal with the critical situation 
taking place in Greece concerning the treatment and fundamental rights of asylum seekers and 
refugees. 
2.  A ‘mass inflow of irregular immigration’ in the Greek-Turkish Border 
The condition for the RABITs mechanism to be activated is that the requesting member state 
needs to be facing “a mass influx of third country nationals attempting to enter its territory 
illegally”.
26 What does a ‘mass influx’ of undocumented immigrants actually mean? According 
to Frontex: 
Due to the exceptionally high numbers of migrants crossing the Greek-Turkish land 
border illegally, Greece now accounts for 90% of all detections of illegal border 
crossings to the EU. In the first half of 2010 a total of 45,000 illegal border crossings 
were reported by the Greek authorities for all their border sectors. Greece currently 
estimates that up to 350 migrants attempt to cross the 12,5-km area near the Greek city 
of Orestiada every day.
27  
How do these figures, and especially that of 90% of irregular entries, stand up to closer 
examination? According to statistics provided by Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN 
Quarterly Update, January-March 2010) published in July 2010, the first quarter of 2010 
continued with a trend already noticeable in 2009 concerning a drop in all indicators of irregular 
immigration into the EU. Around 14,200 detections of irregular external border crossings took 
                                                      
24 Amnesty International and European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) (2010), Briefing on the 
Commission Proposal for a Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union (FRONTEX), September 2010, Brussels, pp 11 and 12. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Recital 7 of the Regulation No. 863/2007. 
27 “Frontex Deploys Rapid Border Intervention Teams to Greece”, Frontex News Releases, 25 October 
2010 (ww.frontex.europa.eu). 8 | CARRERA & GUILD 
 
place during the first three months of 2010. The total number of refusals of entry remained 
rather stable during 2009 and the first quarter of 2010 (+/- 26,500).  
Along with this decreasing trend, it highlighted (p. 10): “In the first quarter of 2010, detections 
of illegal border-crossing at the Greek external border with Turkey (land and sea) were among 
the lowest since the FRAN record started in January 2008. This decreasing trend (land and sea) 
is reflected in all of the top five nationalities which have reached their lowest levels of 
detections: Afghanistan, Palestine, Somalia, Iraq, and Pakistan.”
 Moreover, the report observed 
that the number of detections of irregular crossings in the so-called ‘Eastern Mediterranean 
Route’ during the first quarter of 2010 were the lowest since the beginning of 2008. Detections 
at the Eastern Aegean Sea border with Greece declined over 60% to just under 2,300 detections. 
The FRAN identified a new pattern consisting of a higher number of detections in the Greek-
Turkish land border rather than at sea. On the basis of the figure below, a total number of 
approximately 3,000 detections at the Greek border with Turkey took place in the first quarter 
of 2010. 
Figure 1. Detections of irregular crossings at the Greek border with Turkey 
 
Source: Frontex FRAN Quarterly, first quarter 2010. 
The situation was reported to change in the second quarter of 2010. Frontex statistics published 
in September 2010 referred to the Greek land border as “the hotspot for illegal migration into 
the EU”. The FRAN Quarterly, Update – April – June 2010, stated;  
The Greek land border accounted for around 90% of detections of the illegal border-
crossing, half of which were Albanian workers who routinely cross the border back 
and forth each year to exploit seasonal employment opportunities in Greece. 
Nevertheless, the Greek land border was still the hotspot for illegal migration into the 
EU because the remaining half of the detections of illegal border-crossing (9,500) was 
of migrants intent on transiting Greece to settle in other member states.
28 (emphasis 
added) 
The report identified as one of the major trends in the second quarter of 2010 that  
In the Eastern Mediterranean route, there has been a gradual and recently intensified 
shift from the Greek-Turkish sea border to the land border, where 90% of detections 
were made and nationality swapping is widespread: Asian and Maghreb migrants often 
claim to be from Somalia and Afghanistan, respectively. At the Greek-Turkish land 
border around 60% of detections were made at the Border Control Unit (BCU) 
Orestiada which is under the biggest pressure. 
                                                      
28 Frontex, FRAN Quarterly ,Issue 2, April-June 2010, Warsaw, Poland, September 2010, p. 3. ‘JOINT OPERATION RABIT 2010’ - FRONTEX ASSISTANCE TO GREECE’S BORDER WITH TURKEY | 9 
 
According to the FRAN report “Around two thirds of apprehended illegal migrants were 
reported from the BCU Orestiada (Police Directorate Orestiada) where migratory pressure is 
highest.” The report (p. 11) noted: 
There were a total of 9,500 detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greek external 
border with Turkey. Although an increase compared to the historical low of the 
previous quarter, the total number of detections is still consistent with the seasonal 
fluctuations illustrated, previously observed at this time of year. In the second quarter 
of 2010, detections on this route constituted roughly 90% of the total number of illegal 
border-crossing between border crossing points and the most significant single entry 
point to the EU. 
Figure 2. Detections of irregular border crossings by Afghans at the Greek land and sea border 
 
Source: Frontex FRAN Quarterly, second quarter 2010. 
 
Figure 3. Number of detections between border crossing points by major migratory group 
 
Source: Frontex FRAN Quarterly, second quarter 2010. 
The main nationalities attributed to the peak in numbers of irregular crossings at times of 
determining who these people were. It is striking to see that it was actually Afghanis, 
Palestinians and Somalis who were at the top of the list. Nationals from these countries happen 
to be amongst those with highest number of asylum seekers and refugees according to data 10 | CARRERA & GUILD 
 
provided by the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR. As showed in its 2009 Global Trends Report,
29 
during 2009 one out of four refugees in the world was from Afghanistan (2.9 million), with 
Iraqis being the second largest group (1.8 million) and Somalis, the third (around 700,000). 
Figure 4. Major source countries of refugees, 2009 
 
Source: UNHCR, 2009 Global Trends. 
Do these figures therefore show a “mass inflow of undocumented immigrants” in the Greek-
Turkish land border? Before answering this question, the scope of these numbers needs to be 
put into a proper context. Until recently, there was no statistical data available at EU level on 
the actual degree of human mobility taking place across the common European external borders. 
On the initiative of the Czech Presidency of the EU (first half of 2009), an exercise on data 
collection on entries and exists took place at the external borders of the member states between 
31 August and 6 September 2009. The aim was to gather comparable statistics on entries and 
exits of different categories of travellers (EU citizens and TCNs) at different types of external 
borders (air, sea and land) and at all border crossing points at the external borders. The final 
results of the exercise are summarised in Table 1. 
Table 1. Number of Entries through Air, Land and Sea External Borders in Schengen Member 
States 2009 
  Air  Sea  Land  TOTAL 
31 August – 6 
September 2009 
ESTIMATED 
TOTAL IN 
2009 
European 
Citizens 
2,648,767 442,910  1,617,498  4,709,175  +/-  250,000,000 
Third Country 
Nationals 
        
Non Visa  438,700 110,397  585,479  1,134,576  +/-  61,000,000 
Visa  372,643 31,039  416,920  820,602  +/-  44,000,000 
Total TCNs  811,343 141,436  1,002,399  1,955,178  +/-  105,000,000 
TOTAL  3,460,110 584,346  2,619,897  6,664,353  +/-  355,000,000 
Source: Council of the EU (2009), Results of the Data Collection Exercise, 13267/09, Brussels, 22 
September. 
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A total of around 2 million TCNs entered the common Schengen territory during the reported 
period of one week. When putting these statistics in a yearly basis, and aware of the reservations 
at times of making such calculation, it could be estimated that a total number of around 61 
million TCNs with no visa and +/- 44 million TCNs with visa entered the EU in 2009. This 
would amount to a total of approx. 105 million entries by TCNs during 2009.  
Moreover, when comparing the figure of a total of 9,500 detections of illegal border-crossing at 
the Greek external border with Turkey with the volume of human mobility in airports a different 
picture arises. According to the above-mentioned statistical results of the 2009 data collection 
exercise on (entry/exist) movements in the EU, France, Germany, Spain and the Netherlands 
were the main points of entry of TCNs by air external borders. 
Table 2. Member states with the highest number of entries through EU air external borders  
  Germany  France  The 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Third Country Nationals        
Non Visa  106,716 91,773  45,454  29,184 
Visa  106,242 64,266  30,906  36,080 
TOTAL 
(31 August – 6 September 2009) 
212,958 156,039  76,360  65,264 
ESTIMATED TOTAL IN 2009  10,000,000 7,800,000  3,800,000  3,000,000 
Source: Council of the EU (2009). 
In fact, according to Frontex data, the number of refusals of entry to undocumented immigrants 
through airports accounted to the majority in comparison to those taking place through land 
borders. More particularly, there were 140,000 refusals of entry by TCNs reported by member 
states in 2008.
30 This corresponded with around 60,000 refusals in land borders, some 65,000 in 
air borders and 6,700 in sea borders. During 2009 the number of refusals of entry remained 
“fairly stable” when compared to 2008, showing a decrease of 7% to 113,000. Very few 
refusals of entry were reported in sea borders (4%).The majority of them occurred at air (49%) 
and land borders (47%).  
Therefore we can conclude that the situation of ‘crisis’ and ‘mass inflow of entries’ painted by 
the 90% figure which was originally used by Frontex in order to justify the first deployment of 
the RABITs needs to be taken with great caution when looking at the role played by seasonal 
migration of Albanian workers in that percentage. A different picture arises if we compare these 
figures with the total number of entries by third country nationals into the EU on a yearly basis 
and the number of refusals of entry at air borders. The criteria of ‘mass inflow of undocumented 
immigrants’ falls apart when looking at the nationalities of the persons who have been 
irregularly detected at the land border, which come from countries considered to be amongst the 
main sources of refugees by UNHCR. That notwithstanding, it is necessary to point out that the 
few thousands of detection of irregular entries which have been reported in the first quarter of 
2010 by Frontex in the Greek-Turkish land border (9,500), need to be assessed in a rather 
critical national scenario where the Greek asylum and migration system are in a status of 
perilous failure and dysfunction.  
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3.  The Greek Situation: A Failing Asylum System and its Implications 
on the Dublin System 
Similarly to other ‘Southern-Mediterranean’ EU member states, Greece is located at the front 
line of EU’s (land and maritime) external borders controls. During the last years many have 
been the concerns (and diplomatic lobby) by EU member states’ representatives from countries 
such as Spain, Italy or Malta. They have alluded to the disproportionate level of responsibility 
while holding the common EU external border and the need to strengthen ‘European solidarity’ 
in the Schengen regime. These tensions have only increased along with every new EU 
enlargement process (2004 and 2007) and the consequent gradual moving of the EU external 
border. The position of these countries as ‘the gate keepers’ of the common external frontier has 
not been so far accompanied by any specific EU solidarity mechanism. While numerous have 
been the calls by certain leaders across Europe for ‘more Brussels’ in order to meet common 
challenges, a majority of national governments have been sensitive (and too often hesitant) at 
times of discussing actual measures putting into practice their political narratives on border 
debates beyond the channelling of EU funding to these countries (e.g. the External Borders 
Fund). The main reason for such national resilience has been of course that the scope of 
‘European solidarity’ too often collides with the boundaries of the principle of national 
sovereignty and subsidiarity which still continue to greatly inspire EU discussions around these 
domains.  
The lack of an instrument ensuring ‘solidarity’ beyond financial considerations goes along with 
the inexistence of a monitoring system for the proper implementation of EU border law across 
the common external (air, land and sea) borders.
31 The EU counts since 2006 with the Schengen 
Borders Code which has harmonized the rules applicable to checks and controls on external 
borders crossings. The Code is central as it not only foresees common procedural guarantees for 
those immigrants refused entry (the need for the refusal to be based on a substantiated decision 
stating the grounds and a right of appeal and information). The Code also covers the conduct of 
national border authorities when carrying out border checks, which will need to comply with 
human dignity and the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination. The challenges at 
times of ensuring a harmonious application of the SBC are exacerbated when considering that 
some of the ‘border crossing points’
32 composing the EU external border face more obstacles 
than others at times of meeting the SBC standards due to factors such as the volume of human 
mobility that they experience and/or their geographical location. Border conditions and the 
resource requirements are also extremely variable across the EU, something which makes its 
very difficult for countries like Greece to hold their responsibility while duly respecting rule of 
law standards and fundamental rights of undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers. 
The shifting of responsibility of border controls towards those EU member states responsible 
for the EU external (territorial) border needs to be read along the pitfalls emerging consequence 
of the application of the European Asylum System and the Dublin II Regulation 343/2003.
33 
According to the latter the first EU country through which an asylum seeker has first entered the 
common EU territory is the one responsible for examining the refugee claim. By doing so the 
Dublin System shifts the responsibility for examining asylum applications to those EU member 
                                                      
31  Carrera (2010), op. cit.  
32 According to the Commission there is a total of 1,792 border crossing points (including Romania and 
Bulgaria). Refer to Commission Staff Working Document, “Preparing the next steps in border 
management in the European Union, Impact Assessment”, SEC(2008) 153, Brussels, 13.2.2008, Table 
13, p. 97. 
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responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one Member State by an third country national ‘JOINT OPERATION RABIT 2010’ - FRONTEX ASSISTANCE TO GREECE’S BORDER WITH TURKEY | 13 
 
states holding the common external border. The default criterion is therefore that the member 
state where the applicants submitted her/his application for asylum will be the one responsible 
for its examination. Responsibility is framed as a ‘burden’ (take back and take charge) for the 
member state which permitted the individual to enter and arrive in the EU. The Dublin System 
works under the premises of the principle of mutual recognition of negative decisions (rejection 
of asylum applications), even if the recognition of refugee status remains nationally limited and 
hugely diversified across the EU. It functions on the unfounded presumption that all EU 
member states part of the common EU asylum system comply with similar levels of protection 
of asylum seekers.  
UNHCR has recently described the situation in Greece as a “humanitarian crisis” and concluded 
that “the Greek government has utterly failed to meet its most basic responsibilities to protect 
refugees”.
34 According to UNHCR the recognition rate of refugees at first instance during 2009 
has been only of 0.04 % (11 out of 30.000 applications). All have been treated as undocumented 
immigrants and therefore expelled to Turkey or other third countries with which the country has 
a readmission agreement, or detained. UNHCR data shows that the country has a backlog of 
some 45,000 applications. According to ECRE: 
For those who actually manage to apply for asylum in Greece, there’s no chance of 
being recognized as a refugee. Virtually no asylum seekers (0.3%) were granted 
international protection in Greece in 2009. For instance, while no Iraqi was recognized 
as a refugee in Greece, 77% of Iraqi asylum seekers were granted international 
protection in Germany.
35 
The dysfunctional nature of the Greek asylum system, and the consequent humanitarian crisis, 
has in fact lead to a whole series of reactions by other international and European actors. As a 
way of illustration, after a fact-finding mission in October 2010 the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Manfred Nowak, 
highlighted the systematic detention of undocumented immigrants and asylum seekers in the 
country and concluded that “none of the detention facilities for migrants I have visited can be 
regarded as complying with international minimum standards for humane treatment of 
detainees”.
36 The UN Special Rapporteur also pointed out that “asylum seekers also appear to 
be generally detained until their asylum procedure has been concluded which constitutes a 
violation of Article 5 ECHR” and highlighted: 
Greece suffers from a highly dysfunctional asylum system with protection rates at first 
instance of almost zero per cent. The first instance procedure is in hands of police 
                                                      
34 UNHCR says asylum situation in Greece is ‘a humanitarian crisis’, Briefing Note, 21 September 2010 
(http://www.unhcr.org/4c98a0ac9.html). See also “UNHCR urges EU investment in asylum support for 
Greece”,( http://www.unhcr.org.uk/resources/monthly-updates/greece.html).  
35 ECRE, “Stop sending asylum seekers to Greece”, European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), 
Brussels, 29 October 2010.  
36 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture presents preliminary findings on his Mission to Greece, 20 October 
2010. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/rapporteur It was stated in page 4 that  
The Greek system of migration control relies on systematic detention for irregular migrants. Alternatives 
to detention are hardly considered. Thus, migrants end up in prolonged detention for no other reason than 
not possessing valid papers. This situation is even experienced as unfair by the responsible police 
authorities. The systematic detention of migrants leads to an extreme overcrowding of facilities unsuitable 
for such great numbers of detainees and their long-term detention. In all border guard stations, … I 
witnessed that migrants were locked up in completely overcrowded, filthy and humid cells, often without 
natural light, and with unhygienic and inadequate bathrooms with only cold water and were not or 
inadequately provided with sanitary products such as soap or toilet paper. In some cases detainees had 
even no direct access to toilets, or their access was restricted because of cell shifts… 14 | CARRERA & GUILD 
 
authorities who lack the necessary capacities and expertise in accepting the large 
number of applications. This has created a backlog of more than 52,000 cases to be 
examined as of August 2010…the lack of any individual assessment by Greek police, 
prosecutors or judges whether citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq or the 
Syrian Arab Republic face a serious risk of being deported by Turkish authorities to 
their countries of origin, constitutes a violation of the principle of non-refoulement.
37  
The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg, has stated: “the 
gravely dysfunctional asylum procedures in Greece have brought the Dublin system to a 
genuine collapse and lessons must be drawn from this breakdown” and “a fair and efficient 
system that would fully guarantee the human rights of asylum seekers in Europe is still wanting. 
The Dublin Regulation should be revised as soon as possible in order to put an end to this 
situation”.
38 This has come in response to constant demands by civil society organisations. For 
instance, Amnesty International has raised particular concerns on the poor treatment of asylum-
seekers and irregular migrants in the country, with the detention of unaccompanied minors.
39 
Human Rights Watch has qualified the delay of the Greek government to implemented 
legislative reforms in these domains as “unacceptable” which “creates an urgent need for the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the European Commission to intervene”.
40 A 
coalition of civil society organizations requested the EU to “stop sending asylum seekers to 
countries that do not guarantee their protection” such as Greece and demanded “a complete 
revision of the Dublin Regulation” and a “European suspension mechanism”.
41 
Still, it appears that Greece has received more than 10,000 requests by other EU member states 
for their asylum application to be determined there in light of Dublin system. However, between 
September and October 2010 four EU member states have stopped to apply the EU Dublin 
system, in particular, Belgium, UK, Sweden and the Netherlands.
42 It has also included two 
association states: Iceland and Norway.  
More than 20 NGOs working on the rights of asylum seekers and refugees in Europe have 
lodged a complaint to the European Commission petitioning the latter to start infringement 
proceedings against Greece because of allegations against the former for violating the principle 
of non-refoulement, the right to asylum and human dignity in external sea border practices.
43 
                                                      
37 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture presents preliminary findings on his Mission to Greece, 20 October 
2010, p. 6. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/torture/rapporteur  
38 T. Hammarberg, “The Dublin Regulation undermines Refugee Rights”, Human Rights Comment, 
22.9.2010, http://commissioner.cws.coe.int  
39 Amnesty International, Detention of minors in Greece shows failings of EU’s immigration policy, 
Amnesty International EU Office, Press Release, 27.7.2010; Refer also to Amnesty International (2010), 
Greece: Irregular Migrants and Asylum Seekers Routinely Detained in Substandard Conditions, London, 
UK. http://www.amnesty.eu/static/documents/2010/Greece0710.pdf  
40 Human Rights Watch, Greece: Asylum Reform Delay Unacceptable, 20 September 2010 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/09/20/greece-asylum-reform-delay-unacceptable  
41 ECRE, JRS, Amnesty International, CIRE, BCHV-CBAR and VwV, The EU should stop sending 
asylum seekers to countries that do not guarantee their protection, Joint Press Release, Brussels, 22 
October 2010. http://www.ecre.org/resources/Press_releases/1650  
42 BBC News Europe, “Sweden stops returning migrants to Greece”, 3 November 2010, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11682905 As regards Belgium refer also to 
http://www.melchiorwathelet.be/index.php?mact=News,cntnt01,detail,0&cntnt01articleid=204&cntnt01r
eturnid=317&hl=fr_FR and on the UK http://ncadc.wordpress.com/2010/09/20/uk-suspends-returns-of-
asylum-seekers-to-greece  
43 Refer also to Pro Asyl, Refugee and Migrant Council, Refugee Advice Centre and Dutch Council of 
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The European Commission informally opened infringement proceedings against Greece.
44 
Moreover, the increasing intervention of courts at national and European level are also 
demonstrating the deficits of the European asylum system and the profound tensions that it 
poses to human rights obligations by EU member states.
45 A high number of EU member states 
requests have been frozen by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) Article 39 
procedure (a total of 750).
46 Many more are pending before relevant national tribunals. During 
2009-2010 the ECtHR received more than 700 cases from asylum seekers requesting the 
suspension of the transfer to Greece. 
4.  Conclusion - Testing the EU’s Response 
Is sending the RABITS the most adequate and proportionate answer by the EU to the events 
taking place in Greece? What does it tell us in relation to the principle of solidarity and fair 
sharing of responsibility in the EU? Notwithstanding an agreement between Frontex and the 
UNHCR, the later has received no request from Frontex to participate in Operation RABIT 
2010. It would seem that the presence of UNHCR personnel charged with ensuring that those 
seeking international protection receive a proper procedure was not considered necessary by 
Frontex for this operation.  
The presentation of Frontex Operation RABIT 2010 as ‘the solution’ to the situation at the 
external borders of Greece with Turkey illustrates the kind of responses that the EU prioritises 
in situations such as those taking place in Greece: more security (FRONTEX) and not going at 
the heart of the issue, which is that of human rights protection of refugees and undocumented 
migrants. One would also not expect the RABITs to intervene in order to make the situation 
worse – Frontex’s role is to increase ‘the control’ at the external border and target 
undocumented immigrants, which has been until present the main dilemma in the situation in 
Greece – the increase in human mobility has lead to coercive practices and police-focused 
preventive control, treating every person (including asylum seekers) as ‘irregular immigrants’. It 
is to be hoped that Frontex and the RABITS will not exacerbate this process by treating 
refugees as ‘irregulars’ and expelling them (in violation of the principle of non-refoulement) 
when they are in fact people in search of international protection. The guarantees envisaged in 
the Schengen Borders Code, the EU Asylum Procedures Directive and international refugee and 
human rights law for those immigrants refused entry into the common EU territory must be 
fully applied. Each person apprehended crossing the external border in Operation RABIT 2010 
                                                                                                                                                           
failure to comply with Community law, Failing Member State: Greece, Amsterdam, 19 November 2009, 
retrievable from http://www.proasyl.de/en/home For the complete list of documents substantiating the 
situation in Greece see Pro Asyl website: http://www.proasyl.de/en/topics/european-politics/the-situation-
in-greece 
44  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2009-5426&language=EN See 
also European Commission, Joint Statement by Mr Christos Papoutsis, Minister of Citizen Protection of 
Greece and Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner in charge of Home Affairs: Greece and the 
Commission agree to enhance co-operation on reforming Greek asylum system, MEMO/10/450, 
Brussels, 27 September 2010. 
45 See UNHCR Information Note on National Practice in the Application of Article 3.2 of the Dublin II 
Regulation in particular in the context of intended transfers to Greece, 16 June 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c18e6f92.html  
46 Refer for instance to Press release issued by the Registrar GRAND CHAMBER HEARING, M.S.S. v. 
Belgium and Greece, 1 September 2010, available at 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=873098&portal=hbkm&source=ex
ternalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 See also the landmark ECtHR 
ruling T.I. v. UK, No. 43844/98, 7 March 2000. 16 | CARRERA & GUILD 
 
who indicates a claim for international protection must be safeguarded from refoulement, 
provided with adequate reception conditions and have access to a fair and effective asylum 
procedure including a right of appeal if necessary. If Operation RABIT 2010 has the effect of 
short-circuiting these EU obligations and subjecting people to refoulement sauvage, the EU will 
be shamed before the whole of the international community. Moreover, the participating 
member states will also be potentially liable to legal action before the Human Rights Court in 
Strasbourg for failure to uphold the European Convention on Human Rights. About CEPS
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